Climate skepticism and the manufacture of doubt: can dissent in science be epistemically detrimental?
|Title:||Climate skepticism and the manufacture of doubt: can dissent in science be epistemically detrimental?|
|Publication Date:||October 2015|
|Published In:||European Journal for Philosophy of Science|
|Description:||© 2014, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.The aim of this paper is to address the neglected but important problem of differentiating between epistemically beneficial and epistemically detrimental dissent. By “dissent,” we refer to the act of objecting to a particular conclusion, especially one that is widely held. While dissent in science can clearly be beneficial, there might be some instances of dissent that not only fail to contribute to scientific progress, but actually impede it. Potential examples of this include the tobacco industry’s funding of studies that questioned the link between smoking and lung cancer, and the attempt by the petroleum industry and other groups to cast doubt upon the conclusion that human consumption of fossil fuels contributes to global climate change. The problem of distinguishing between good and bad dissent is important because of the growing tendency of some stakeholders to attempt to delay political action by ’manufacturing doubt’ (Oreskes & Conway 2010). Our discussion in this paper focuses on climate science. This field, in our view, is rife with instances of bad dissent. On the basis of our discussion of climate science, we articulate a set of sufficient conditions for epistemically problematic dissent in general, which we call “the inductive risk account of epistemically detrimental dissent.”|
|Ivan Allen College Contributors:|
|Citation:||European Journal for Philosophy of Science. 5. Issue 3. 261 - 278. ISSN 1879-4912. DOI 10.1007/s13194-014-0101-x.|